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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KAY J. LARSEN,
Plaintiff

& Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 18198

JUDY LARSEN (THOMAS),
Defendant & Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT KAY J. LARSEN

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a review of judgement entered by the Third
District Court in and for the County of Salt Lake, Honorable
Ernest F. Baldwin presiding, pursuant to Appellant's Order to
Show Cause in re Contempt and child support arrearage.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court entered judgement for Plaintiff

& Respondent for $3,600.00 child support arrearage, attorney's
fees of $175.00 and costs of

$17~50.

A three day jail sentence

was stayed as long as Plaintiff /Respondent made regular payments
as due and $50.00 per month on the arrearage.

Later, after

hearing pet!tion to modify the decree, the court awarded an increase of $25.00 per month per child to be paid until each of
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two children graduated from High School or if they did not
graduate,

then until age 18.

The modification is not an issue.

RELIEF SOUGHT BY RESPONDENT
Respondent seeks dismissal of Appellant's appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent agrees with the facts as stated by Respondent except where the Appellant states that "Plaintiff /Respondent
stipulated that he had rtot allocated any of the payments to any
particular portion of the arrearage."

The Plaintiff/Respondent

did not appear in court and his counsel made no such stipulation;
any representation to that effect is a completely unsupported
fabrication and constitutes an unethical attempt to create support
for issues that were not raised at hearing on the Appellant's
Order to Show Cause.
The Appellant's references to her memorandum and "full
accounting" are not agreed with:
a tabular re-cap of the payments

the "full accounting" is merely
mad~

as reflected by the Alimony

Clerk's record of payments received from the Respondent since the
divorce of the parties.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED AND NO BOND
FOR COSTS ON APPEAL HAS BEEN FILED; THEREFORE, THIS COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL AND APPELLANT HAS NOT PERFECTED
HER APPEAL. THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
An appeal must be taken within one month of the final
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order appealed from or the Supreme Court can have no jurisdiction
to hear the matter.

Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Anderson v. Anderson, 3 U. (2d) 277, 282 P.2d 845.
Estate of v. Conrad, 19 U.(2d) 346, 431 P. 2d 571.

Ratliff,
Anderson v.

Halthusen Mercantile Co., 30 U. 31, 83 P. 560.
Hearing was had on Appellant's Order to Show Cause
July 9, 1981 (R.p.71).

Parties counsel stipulated that the pay-

ments made to Appellant by Respondent were correctly reflected
on photo copies of the Alimony Clerk's records.

(R.p. 85-87).

Appellant, on July 15, 1981 submitted a "Motion for Rehearing,
(R.p.79) and submitted therewith a memorandum.

(R.p.74-78).

Ap-

pellant's motion was heard August 19, 1981, Respondent was granted
seven days to file a responsive memorandum.

(R.p.89-92).

There-

after, Appellant's petition to modify decree of divorce (R.p.66)
was heard on October 7, 1981 (R.p.88).

At this hearing the court

was asked for its ruling on the support arrearage and contempt
matter, at which time the court stated it wouid stand by the
ruling it made on July 9, 1981, counsel for appellant was directed
to prepare the Order.

On October 12, 1981, Appellant's counsel

sent a copy of a proposed judgement, with an attached letter, to
Respondent's counsel, stating if no objection was voiced within

7 days, the order would then be submitted to the judge for signiture.

(See Exhibit "A", Affadavit of Respondent's counsel and

attachments).

Two days thereafter, on October 14, 1981, Respondent's

counsel sent a letter to counsel for Appellant setting forth objections to the language of the order.

(Attachment 2).

No re-

sponse to that letter was received, so on November 6, 1981, another
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letter, (attachment No. 3 to Exhibit "A"), was sent to Appellant's
counsel along with a copy of a proposed judgement.

The letter

stated that if there was no objection thereto made within seven
day~

the judgement would be submitted to the judge for

sign~ture.

No objection was raised and on November 17, 1981, the judgement
was submitted to Judge Baldwin for signature and it was entered
by the court on November 18, 1981. (R.p.93-94).

There was no

appeal taken from this judgement within one month from its entry.
Appellant filed her notice of appeal January 4, 1982.
The record is confusing because the judgement submitted
to Respondent's counsel for approval, and not approved, now appears in the record, (R.p.95-96),showing it to have been signed
on October 12, 1981 (the same day it was supposedly mailed to
Respondent's counsel) and entered by the Clerk of the Court on
December 1, 1981.
Respondent therefore submits that the judgement dated
October 12, 1981 was erroneously or improperly submitted and
signed and should be of no effect; prejudgement interest was not
no~

asked for,

was it awarded by the trial court; the method of

calculation is unknown, the interest rate used is wrong, and therefore the amount improper.

These were the reasons Respondent ob-

jected to this judgement as originally prepared.
Therefore, the Appellant's Notice of Appeal was not timely
filed, being filed more than one month after the 18th day of November 1981.

(The existance of a judgement signed October 12, 1981

was not discovered by Respondent until the day before hearing of
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Respondent's motion to dismiss Appellant's appeal.)
The Appellant's appeal should likewise be dismissed
for failure of Appellant to perfect her appeal by filing of a
bond for costs on appeal, the requirement for which was never
waived.
POINT II
THE ISSUE OF ALLOCATION OF PAYMENTS WAS NOT RAISED PRIOR TO
HEARING ON APPELLANT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THEREON.
The Appellant's two Orders to Show Cause (R.p. 65 &

66) do not allege any allocation of payments and are in fact
not supported by either affadavit or verified petition appearing
in the record.

Therefore, the issue of allocation of payments

was not raised, nor were the Appellant's pleadings ever amended
to include such issue, nor did the trial court hear evidence
thereon.

The only evidence before the lower court were the photo

copies of the Third District Court's Alimony Clerk's records of
payments (R.p. 85-87), which only show the date and amount received by the clerk and the date and amount forwarded to Appellant.
The matter of allocation of a payment is a matter of intent
of the

pay~r

or if not in any way determinable, of the payee.

(See 60 Am Jur 2d §80 et seq.).

However, there is, as earlier

mentioned, no evidence at all before the court on the issue.
issue was not raised by Appellant before the trial court.

The

However,

it is obvious that if a non-custodial parent, owing a support
obligation, has financial demands that exceed his income periodically and he is unable to pay all of his financial obligations and
therefore fails to make one or more of these support payments; the
next payment he in fact makes is intended by him to pay the supSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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port obligation due the month of his payment.

Where an obliger

has the right to allocate and if he knows of that right, he
certainly will allocate the payment in a manner that will best
serve the interests of himself and his immediate family.
The dicta cited in Seely:-,. v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 at 685
(Utah 1975) is not supported by reference to any evidence there
before the court.

The court said" ... the presumption is that a

payment made without specific allocation is to be applied against
the oldest part of the debt."

Whether specific allocation had

been made or not is a question of fact and the court in Seeley
says nothing of how or where that fact was decided.

It appears

there, as in the instant case, that it had not been decided.
In questions of allocation, consideration - would also
be given to the rights and interests of third parties.

As

stated in 60 Arn Jur 2d §91:
... If the debtor fails to direct the
application of his payment, and the
creditor does not exercise his right
of application, the law will apply the
payment to the oldest debt, unless
justice and equity demand a different
appropriation, or unless the rights and
e uities of third persons are involved.
Emphasis added
Here, the Respondent has two young children and a wife
who is a full time mother and homemaker, (R.p.83) and therefore
justice, equity and the third parties interests would not be served
by saddling their provider with a judgement three times that awarded by the trial court.
The courts in certain cases cited by Appellant, Seely
(supra.), Chudzinski vs. Chudzinski, 26 Ariz App 130, 546 P.2d 1139
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(1976); Young v. Williams, 583 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1978) and
others, are unfairly equating support cases to commercial and
contract cases, by applying the theory of allocation to them.
The courts go beyond that, and without making factual inquiry
about the obligors intent as to allocation, indulge in a fictional
assumption.

The courts apply the allocation theory, one of the

foundations of which is that the obligor has· the right to allocate, in cases where there is no evidence at all about the obligors
actual allocation or intent to allocate.

In doing so, they fail

to make inquiry about the obligor's allocation, but presume there
was none.
It is unjust to allow application of "allocation" doctrine to situations in which the obligor is totally unaware of
what his rights are under such doctrine.

Such blanket application

of the doctrine results in great unfairness.

For a "worst cas-e"

example, assume that a divorced non-custodial parent under a support obligation experienced severe financial problems, paid nothing
for the first eight years after his divorce, then after rehabilitating himself for the next eight years was able to pay each
current payment as it became due.

Under the allocation doctrine

as Appellant would have it applied, the parent could have judgement
taken against him for the full eight years of support payments if
he had not allocated his payments to current support obligations.
Respondent acknowledges children's need for support,
but the courts create great mischief when they attempt to insulate
some parties over others from certain realities of life:

such
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as those times when there is legitimately not enough money to
cover basic expenses.

The courts should make inquiry in these

situations and not unjustly penalize a non-custodial parent for
matters beyond his control.
POINT III
THE APPELLANT IS NOT LAWFULLY ENTITLED TO THE FUNDS SHE SEEKS
BY REASON OF HAVING ASSIGNED THEM TO THE STATE AND HAS THEREFORE PERPETRATED A FRAUD ON THE COURT FOR NOT SO DIVULGING.
HER APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED AND REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT
FOR DETERMINATION OF ANY PROPER AMOUNT SHE MAY BE DUE.
Respondent learned after the Appellant had filed her
notice of appeal. that she had signed an assignment of support
obligation to the State of Utah (R.p.111) and that she had
received certain public assistance payments from the ·state.
(as partially set forth on R.p. 110)
Respondent became aware of the foregoing when the State
of Utah served him with the proceedings via the Clark County,
Nevada Court, which pleadings are in the record, page 101-119.
From the URESA pleadings, it is evident that Appellant
is not entitled to recover any sums due her for the months she
received public assistance.
the State of Utah.

Those amounts would be properly due

In fact, Appellant, having received both sup-

port payments from Respondent and public assistance from the State
of Utah for the same month, would be guilty of fraud.
Therefore, the matter should be remanded to the trial
court in order that the judgement may be properly adjusted.

Note

also that according to DeAnna Earl, investigator for the Office of
Recovery Services, the amounts shown as paid to Appellant are not
complete.

Appellant received public assistance as early as 1967.
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(Exhibit "B", letter from DeAnna Earl to Jo Kost dated April
14, 1982)
CONCLUSION
The Appellant's appeal, not being timely taken should
be dismissed.

The judgement signed October 12, 1981 was erron-

eously or improperly submitted to the court, Appellant's counsel
had purportedly given Respondent's counsel seven days to comment
or object to the proposed language of the judgement yet the
trial court signed said judgement the day it was shown as being
mailed to Respondent's counsel.
judgement aside.

This court should then set this

The judgement signed November 17, 1981 was

submitted to and signed by the court after Appellant failed to
respond to Respondent's objections and comments and after notice
of preparation of the corrected judgement, and after having had
ample time to comment thereon before it was submitted to the
Court.

In any event, the notice of appeal was not filed within

one month of the signing of the judgement of October 12, 1981 nor
the docketing of the judgement signed November 17, 1981.

Why the

earlier judgement was not filed until December 1, 1981 is an unexplained fluke and should not serve to improperly extend the time
for appeal.
For the reasons heretofore stated, the doctrine of allocation should not be applied where the issue was never raised in
the pleadings at the Order to Show Cause hearing and where there
was no evidence taken thereon.
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Since it is clear that Appellant is not entitled to
the full amount of the judgement heretofore entered and h~s
attempted to perpetrate a fraud on the court for failure to
divulge her assignment of support, her appeal should be dismissed and remanded to the trial court for such further proceedings as are appropriate.

In fact, the provisions of §

55-15c-5(3) Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, so requires.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ..!?/___ day of June, 1982.

J],~~~~

D. KENDALLERKINS
Attorney for Plaintiff /Respondent
525 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-2552
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Responden1
Brief, postage prepaid, to Phippil A. Harding, attorney for
Appellant, 175

~~th

West Temple, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101 this .&_!fday of June, 1982.
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